I study the effects of tax evasion on economic growth by focusing on the cultural aspects of tax compliance and their effect on the extensive margin of tax evasion. A cultural norm that determines the contemptibility of tax dodging practices links the past incidence of tax evasion with the tax payers' current incentives to conceal sources of income. This dynamic complementarity may lead to multiple equilibria in the evolution of tax evasion. Due to the latter's effect on capital accumulation, this multiplicity may lead economies in divergent development paths, as long as they differ in the initial magnitude of tax evasion. This happens even though economies may be, on the outset, identical in terms of capital stock and structural characteristics, including those that govern tax enforcement.
Introduction
Taxation is an important economic policy tool. Tax receipts are a major source of revenues through which governments can finance the adoption of policies such as the provision of productivity-enhancing public services and infrastructure, the redistribution of income etc. Nevertheless, this source of revenues relies, to some extent, on the tax payers' self-reporting of their circumstances with regard to income and wealth. Unfortunately, there is a moral hazard problem inherent to this situation:
Despite the fact that many people want to enjoy the benefits accruing from public policies such as the ones mentioned above, fewer of them are willing to contribute their fair share towards the cost of their adoption and implementation. Of course, such circumstances point to the problem of tax evasion, i.e., the illegal practice of reducing one's tax obligation by means of concealing sources of income and wealth from the authorities.
The concerns over the problem of tax evasion should not be restricted to moral grounds. On the contrary, its effects can be far more pervasive and impinge on the overall economic environment. Quantifying such effects is not straightforward though, mainly because the clandestine nature of tax evasion makes it difficult to devise precise measures of its magnitude. Despite this fact, over the past few decades a number of researchers have endeavoured to construct and propose reliable estimates that quantify the extent of this problem. 1 A look at the estimates for tax evasion across Europe, as these are presented by Nam et al. (2001) and Tsakumis et al. (2007) , reveals that those countries with the lowest rates of tax compliance (i.e., Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy) are also among the countries that have experienced the more pronounced and persistent impact from the Great Recession. In a recent interview, the US president Barack Obama cited Greece's notoriously problematic tax collection mechanism -calling it "famously terrible" -as the prime example of the structural inadequacies that have plunged the country to its severe debt crisis and prolonged recession. 2 The above are perhaps prima facie evidence that the problem of tax evasion can have a pivotal role in a country's economic woes. Moreover, they may justify the European Commission's objective to promote and intensify the combined efforts in tackling tax evasion, as part of the overall strategy for the achievement of its political and economic priorities for Europe. 3 The fact that the estimates of tax compliance across nations are persistently varied raises a pertinent question: Is tax evasion a problem related solely to the degree of tax enforcement, or is it also symptomatic of the deeper cultural and social characteristics of a nation? While there can be little objection to the view that tax enforcement policies, such as frequent tax audits and legal sanctions, can reduce the tax payers' incentives to conceal sources of income and wealth from the authorities, the idea that tax compliance also rests on cultural characteristics has also gained momentum among researchers.
Indeed there is a plethora of empirical analyses that offer credence to this view. Grasmick and Scott (1982) used survey data and found that the perception of social stigma had a significant impact on the respondents' intentions to engage in tax evasion.
Baldry (1986) presented the results of experiments showing that the moral costs associated with the revelation of tax evasion are important determinants of tax compliance, while Gächter (2007) interpreted experimental evidence as suggestive that, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of someone engaging in tax evasion is higher if he/she believes that others behave similarly -an idea that is also echoed by Frey (1997) . Based on their empirical study, Tsakumis et al. (2007) concluded that the characteristics of national culture are significant in explaining international differences in tax evasion.
The relevance of social and cultural dimensions as driving forces behind the persistence of tax evasion gains further support once we consider actual policy plans that have been designed and implemented in order to tackle the high prevalence of activities broadly associated with corruption -activities that include tax fraud. A relevant example is certainly the policy strategy by Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). 4 Since its establishment during the mid-70s, and as part of its overall strategy in eradicating the problem of endemic corruption in Hong Kong, the ICAC instigated an education programme that was applied to all levels, from kindergarten to higher education. The purpose of the scheme was to make the younger generations aware of the injustice and the adverse socio-economic consequences of corruption, thus discouraging their adherence and/or tolerance to such nefarious activities in the future. This paper is motivated by the aforementioned issues. Particularly, my objective is to identify the forces behind tax evasion persistence, and analyse its implications for economic growth, in an overlapping generations (OLG) model where cultural characteristics affect tax compliance. These characteristics impinge on a tax payer's incentive to engage in tax evasion by determining the non-pecuniary (i.e., psychic) costs incurred by those whose fraudulent behaviour is exposed -costs that could comprise social stigma, reputation damage, shame etc. I draw on Gordon (1989) by assuming that these physic costs are driven by a culturally induced, dynamic externality. Particularly, the ignominy of being exposed as a tax evader is negatively related to the incidence of tax evasion among individuals of the previous generation. The dynamic process that ensues due to this effect may generate three steady state equilibria, one of which is unstable and acts as a threshold. Consequently, even when the characteristics of tax enforcement are fixed, tax evasion will converge to a long-run equilibrium where its magnitude can be either low or high, depending on whether the economy's pre-existing condition with regard to the number of people who evade their taxes lies below or above the threshold. Given the detrimental impact of tax evasion on the (endogenous) process of capital accumulation, this multiplicity can pervade the overall economic environment and determine an economy's long-term prospects. Economies that are on the outset identical in terms of structural characteristics, including those characteristics that govern the degree of tax enforcement, and capital stock, may follow divergent development paths as long as they differ in their initial level of tax compliance. This is because the cultural norm that affects the individuals' incentives towards tax evasion acts as a propagation mechanism that perpetuates such differences, thus ingraining the society's attitudes towards tax compliance. The resulting persistence in the magnitude of tax evasion has significant repercussions for the processes of capital formation and economic growth. 5 5 In a model where the interactions between corrupt politicians and tax evading households generate selffulfilling equilibria, Litina and Palivos (2014) show that the presence of social stigma can actually eliminate Although there are a number of analyses that have addressed the relation between tax evasion and economic growth within the context of dynamic general equilibrium models, their focus, results, and implications are rather different compared to the present analysis. Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) employ a monetary growth model in which tax evasion induces the government to repress the financial sector, as a means of increasing money demand, expanding the inflation tax base and, therefore, covering the shortfall in tax revenues. Consequently, there is a reduction in the growth rate because financial repression impedes the process of capital accumulation. In the analysis of Chen (2003) , tax evasion has a negative effect on growth because it induces the policy maker to increase the tax rate above the one associated with growth maximisation.
Nevertheless, his calibration exercise indicates that the quantitative benefits of stronger tax enforcement may be small, unless the elasticity of output with respect to public capital is relatively high. Both these analyses are based on representative agent frameworks that abscond from the cultural aspects of tax compliance and do not consider the possibility of multiple equilibria. Blackburn et al. (2006) construct an OLG model in which corrupt tax auditors receive bribes from households in order to facilitate them in concealing their tax evasion. They find two-way causal effects between corruption and economic growth, suggesting the possibility of multiple equilibria. When this possibility materialises, it is the current stock of capital, rather than the magnitude of the tax evasion problem, that determines the economy's dynamic path of economic development. Furthermore, they do not account for the social and cultural aspects of tax compliance -in their model, all households will engage in tax evasion, as long as they find a corrupt public official who is willing to help them conceal their tax fraud. In this respect, the analysis that is conceptually closer to mine is that of Bethencourt and Kunze (2013) since they also incorporate a dynamic cultural externality à la Gordon (1989) in an OLG framework. Nevertheless, the scope and the results of their analysis are quite different. Predominantly, their objective is to examine how the effect of social norms on tax compliance can account for the positive relation between marginal tax rates and tax evasion, the reduction of the tax evasion/GDP ratio over the transition, and the positive effect of GDP per capita on tax compliance. Their model does not generate multiple equilibrium multiplicity. In their model, the social stigma is proportional to the amount of evaded taxes; it is not affected by the number of individuals who engage in tax dodging practices. equilibria in tax evasion and they do not consider the causal effect of tax evasion on capital accumulation, due to the absence of a productive role for public spending, as well as the lack of any effect of tax evasion on saving behaviour. In my model, tax evasion impedes capital accumulation through two distinct effects -the reduction in productivity-enhancing public spending and the reduction in aggregate private saving.
It is for this reason that the multiplicity in the dynamics of tax evasion can have persistent effects on the economy's long-term prospects.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, I outline the economic environment. In Section 3, I analyse the equilibrium characteristics of tax compliance, I introduce the cultural norm that generates dynamics in the incidence of tax evasion, and I derive the conditions under which the model generates equilibrium multiplicity and persistence in tax evasion. Section 4 focuses on capital accumulation, while Section 5 analyses the joint determination of tax evasion and economic development. In Section 6, I discuss and conclude.
The Economy
Time is measured in discrete intervals that represent periods and are indexed by 0,1, 2,... t  ,. The economy is populated by a sequence of overlapping generations of individuals who live for three periods -childhood, youth, and maturity. The population mass of each age cohort is constant over time and equal to  1 n .
Consider the individuals who are born in period t . They are active during the two periods of their adulthood, i.e. their youth (period  1 t ) and their maturity (period  2 t ), and have preferences over their consumption during maturity, denoted 2 t c . 6 These preferences are represented by a utility function 
In what follows, I shall be considering the specific functional form
During their youth they supply labour to firms that produce the economy's final good and, in exchange, they receive the competitive salary per unit of effective labour. The income of all young individuals is subject to a flat tax (0,1) φ . They save their disposable labour income so that when they retire, i.e., during their maturity, they can finance their consumption expenditures by using the proceeds from savings.
As a means of introducing the characteristics that will allow some tax payers to make a convincing, but ultimately false, declaration of their income, I follow Blackburn et al. (2006) in assuming that individuals are heterogeneous in their labour endowments.
Whereas a fraction  1 x of young individuals will be endowed with one unit of effective labour, nature will bestow  1 l (  0 l ) units of effective labour on the remaining fraction (0, 1) x  of individuals. To save on notation, henceforth I normalise  1 xn so that
. I shall also assume that the endowment of effective labour is private information to each person, rather than being publicly observable.
Output is produced by a unit mass of perfectly competitive firms that combine capital, denoted t K , and labour from young individuals, denoted t L , in order to
where the variable t A denotes total factor productivity and a ( 1 a  ) is the capital (labour) share of total income. Productivity can be enhanced by the provision of public services and infrastructure, denoted t G . 7 In order to finance its expenses for the provision of public infrastructure, the government utilises tax revenues on the basis of a continuously balanced budget. Denoting total tax revenues by Φ t , it follows that
I draw on Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) in assuming that the productivitypromoting role for public services and infrastructure is subject to congestion:
Productivity increases as long as public spending rises relative to total output. In other words, an increase in total output, for given t G , will reduce the quality and availability of public infrastructure. Formally, I capture this idea by specifying
As we can see, this is flexible parameterisation so that, in the absence of productivityenhancing government spending, i.e., when  0 t G , the production technology reduces to the more conventional form with a constant shift factor, i.e.,
Final good producers rent capital from perfectly competitive financial intermediaries.
These intermediaries pool the savings that are deposited to them from young individuals and use them as inputs to an investment technology that generates one unit of capital in period  1 t for each unit of output deposited in period t . Using t S to denote the total amount of deposits that financial intermediaries receive, the preceding discussion implies that
Tax Evasion
Consider an individual who is representative of the  1 n ones endowed with one unit of effective labour. This person will earn labour income equal to 1 t w and, after paying taxes, will deposit her entire disposable income of
Assuming that the gross interest on saving is 2 
Now let us consider a person who is representative of the unit mass of individuals to whom nature endows  1 l units of effective labour. As long as she is honest in reporting her true circumstances, the decision making process is similar to the one I described before. The only difference is that disposable labour income corresponds to
Therefore, the individual whose income is truthfully declared to authorities will enjoy utility according to
Nevertheless, the fact that the individual's endowment of effective labour and, therefore, her income are private information generates a moral hazard problem.
Particularly, by masquerading as a person who was endowed with only one unit of effective labour, she can declare only 1 t w  , thus evading taxes on the part of labour income that corresponds to 1 t w l. Of course, this implies that disposable (after-tax) income is
In this case however, by depositing her entire disposable income to financial intermediaries, the individual may undermine the effort to conceal her wrongdoing as the excessive saving (relative to the reported income) may alert the authorities on her misconduct. For this reason, she can access an 'underground' storage technology in order to save the amount of concealed income. In practical terms, this storage technology may capture the use of offshore bank accounts as a means of concealing income -a well-known and documented practice, sometimes associated with tax evasion and avoidance. 9 The return to this storage technology is lower compared to what the formal financial sector offers. Particularly, it yields    2 2 t t q r units of output during maturity for each unit of output stored during youth. The assumption
guarantees that a deposit to the formal financial sector is the most rewarding method of saving income that is truthfully reported. Otherwise, no one would deposit their savings to financial intermediaries, irrespective of whether they evade taxes or not. Consistent with these ideas, in what follows I shall be assuming that
where (0,1) ξ  .
Let us consider a tax evading individual who remains undetected. Given the above,
Naturally, for tax evasion to be a meaningful option, the utility of an individual who evades taxes, but remains undetected, must exceed the utility that accrues when the person is honest in reporting her actual income. Comparing (6) and (8), it follows that this is the case when 1 ξ φ   -a condition that is assumed to hold thereafter. 9 See Johannesen and Zucman (2014). Now, let us consider a tax evading individual who is eventually detected and apprehended for her misdemeanour. In this case, she will be forced to pay the taxes that apply to the income she concealed, augmented by the penalty rate 1 p  . To ensure that this penalty does not impinge on the part of labour income that was declared and taxed,
, the taxes and penalties on the concealed income will be paid out of the amount that the individual would have otherwise stored, rather than having it deposited to financial intermediaries. Moreover, given the detection and punishment for tax evasion, all remaining after-tax income will be invested to the option that offers the higher return, i.e., it will be deposited to financial intermediaries. It follows that the individual's consumption during maturity is
a level of consumption expenditures that, due to  1 p , falls short of the one that accrues
Put differently, a person who engages in tax evasion, but is eventually apprehended, is strictly worse-off compared to a person who is honest when declaring her income to authorities. 11 On top of the financial penalty, the individual who is caught having evaded taxes faces an additional cost. This cost is psychic, rather than pecuniary, and captures the direct utility loss due to the social stigma, the reputation damage, the shame, and the distress that could result from the revelation of her transgression. There are many ways one could incorporate this cost in the framework of analysis. In order to facilitate the model's tractability and to avoid making the intuition of its mechanisms impenetrable, I follow Varvarigos and Arsenis (2015) in assuming that this cost is proportional to the individual's utility from consumption. Specifically, a tax evading individual who is eventually apprehended will enjoy utility according to
is the term that measures the aforementioned utility cost. For now, I take 1 (0,1) t ψ   as given but later I will delve deeper into its underlying characteristics.
Substituting (9) in the utility function, it follows that
So far, I have described the circumstances that surround the individual, conditional on either remaining undetected or being apprehended for her nefarious practices.
Naturally, her ex ante utility will weight these circumstances, depending on the corresponding probability of each outcome's materialisation. To this purpose, I shall assume that, after declaring her income and paying taxes, she will face the possibility of being audited. The process of auditing will reveal that the tax evading individual has not been sincere in the declaration of her actual income. Furthermore, this process will add a source of heterogeneity among the unit mass of individuals who would consider misreporting their true income. Particularly, an individual i faces a probability
of being audited. This probability is uniformly distributed among the unit mass of individuals who will consider misleading the authorities by fabricating their actual circumstances. Its density function is denoted
Here, the heterogeneity is meant to capture the idea that people have varying abilities in circumventing the laws applicable to tax evasion. For example, some may be more vigilant in keeping a low profile that would not alert others on their excessive disposable income. Alternatively, it may capture the idea that some individuals have connections to people in the public administration and bureaucracy, i.e., people that could facilitate them in eluding detection and punishment (Shik 1991, Xin and Pearce 1996). 12 Given the above, the expected utility of a person who contemplates tax evasion is (8) and (10),
Naturally, the individual will decide to make a false declaration of her income, thus evading part of her tax liability, as long as the expected utility from doing so exceeds the utility that she will enjoy if she is honest about her actual income. The marginal individual is the one who is indifferent between the two options, i.e., the person for
. Let σ , h and η be composite parameter terms given by
and
respectively. Given (12)- (14), we can establish that σ η h   . It follows that  (1 )
so that individuals for whom 
The results in (15) and (16) elucidate the characteristics that determine the magnitude of tax evasion, as this is measured by the total number of individuals who will ultimately engage in such wrongdoing. Given these, it is straightforward to establish the result that is formally presented in Proposition 1. The number of individuals who will engage in tax evasion increases when:
i. the psychic cost that they incur if they are eventually exposed, i.e.,
ii. the penalty rate p decreases;
iii. the gap between the returns of formal saving and storage decreases, i.e., if ξ increases;
iv. the degree of risk aversion falls, i.e., if θ increases.
Proof. See the Appendix □
The mechanisms behind these results are straightforward. The direct utility cost ( 1 t ψ  ) that is borne by those who are revealed as having unlawfully avoided part of their tax liability, increases the overall expected costs of such misconduct, thus hindering the incentive to engage in tax evasion. The penalty rate ( p ) applied to the concealed income increases the expected cost of tax evasion, whereas an increase in the gap between the returns of formal saving and storage (i.e., a lower ξ ) increases the opportunity cost of not depositing the hidden income to financial intermediaries -both effects induce fewer individuals to engage in tax evasion. Finally, individuals who are more risk averse (i.e., those with lower θ ) will be less inclined to opt for the uncertain outcome associated with their effort to evade taxes.
In terms of the tax rate, note that there are two conflicting effects of a higher φ on tax evasion. On the one hand, it increases the individual's cost of declaring her income truthfully. On the other hand, given the presence of the penalty rate p , it also increases disproportionally the expected pecuniary costs associated with tax evasion. 13 For the specific case where 1 θ  , the results in (12)-(16) indicate that
Taking the derivative
, it is straightforward to establish that its sign depends on the sign of the expression
which is unambiguously positive given that it can be rearranged to yield
meaning that in this case the former (positive) effect dominates. However, the two conflicting effects to which I alluded earlier make it difficult to sign . As we can see, the number of individuals that engage in tax evasion increases as the tax rate becomes higher -an outcome that is consistent with existing evidence (e.g., Clotfelter 1983). 
Relatively low p

The Dynamics of Tax Evasion
The result in Proposition 1 revealed that the psychic cost (e.g., social stigma; shame; reputation damage etc.) from the revelation of a person's wrongdoing, is an important factor in determining the extent of tax compliance. In this part of the analysis, the term 1 t ψ  will become a focal point: By endogenising its characteristics, I shall develop a framework where the incidence of tax evasion will be inherently dynamic due to the presence of intergenerational externalities in the determination of cultural values and moral codes.
The scenario I postulate is one where each person's personality traits (i.e., attitudes; values; moral codes etc.) are built during childhood. In shaping these characteristics, the overall social environment and the relevant cultural norms play an important role. In the context of this model, the attitudes towards the issue of tax evasion will depend on how prevalent such behaviour is at the time when each person forms the set of her personality characteristics, i.e., during her childhood. Indeed, one would presume that tax evasion would be a less contemptible practice if, at the time they form the set of attitudes and moral codes, individuals are exposed to an environment where more people adhere to this practice. Accordingly, during their adulthood, these individuals will be less susceptible to the ignominy of being exposed as having sought to mislead authorities in order to dodge their tax liability. These ideas are not mere theoretical conjectures. On the contrary, there is evidence in support of such behavioural traits. For example, Barr and Serra (2010) employed university students in a bribery experiment and found that those who grew up in countries where the level of corruption is high were more likely to engage in bribery. The conclusion, in their own words, was that "social norms, values and beliefs internalized during childhood may play a determining role in individuals' decisions…later in life" (Barr and Serra 2010, p. 863). 14 I capture the aforementioned ideas by following Gordon (1989) and assuming that the psychological factor 1 t ψ  is negatively related to the number of individuals who engaged in tax evasion during the previous period. 15 Formally,
where Ψ ( ) 0 t e   , Ψ(0) m  and Ψ(1) z  such that 0 1 z m    . 16 Substituting (15) and (17) in (16) 
an expression that elucidates the point that was made earlier. Specifically, the intergenerational nature of the cultural externality that I posited through the expression 14 Similar implications for the issue of corporate tax evasion emerge in the study of DeBacker et al. (in press). 15 A similar idea, but in a static context, has been employed by Kim (2003) in a model of tax evasion and income inequality. 16 During the initial period 0 t  , there is a given 0 Ψ that implicitly defines an initial value 1 e  . This can represent the number of the initial old individuals that do not nurture the young with the view that tax evasion is a contemptible enough practice.
in (17) is an underlying source of dynamics in the incidence of tax evasion among individuals.
Let us examine whether there are steady state solutions 1t t e e e    to which the incidence of tax evasion will converge in the long-run. Using (18) , it is straightforward to establish that
where 0 1 f f    . The analysis in (19) 
In order to facilitate the tractability of the subsequent analysis, I shall employ a specific functional form for the direct utility cost incurred by individuals who have been apprehended for evading their taxes. Henceforth, the function
where , 0 κ v  and 1 β  . Notice that in this case, the term Ψ(1) z  corresponds to the composite parameter term mκ z κ v   . Given (24) , the term Ψ( ) Ψ ( ) e e e   can be written as
which can be substituted back in (23) , resulting in
Next, I shall define the composite terms
and assume that κ is sufficiently low, or v is sufficiently high, in order for the following condition to hold: As long as the responsiveness to the pre-existing level of tax evasion -an effect that comes through the influence of the cultural norm on 1 t ψ -does not affect the curvature of the function ( ) t F e significantly, then the dynamics of tax evasion will generate a unique steady state equilibrium, like the one illustrated on the phase diagram of Figure   2 . No matter what the existing conditions regarding the incidence of tax evasion are, in the long-run this will converge to ê . Current imbalances in the magnitude of tax evasion among different economies will eventually wane, insofar as these economies are structurally similar. 18 The Appendix provides explicit solutions for e  and e  . Figure 3 . What is critical here is whether the preexisting conditions with respect to tax dodging practices among tax payers is below or above ˆm e . In the former case, the social stigma associated with the revelation of such behaviour is strong enough to induce a higher degree of tax compliance, thus keeping the incidence of tax evasion low over time. In the latter case, the social stigma attached to the potential disclosure of a person's transgression is not sufficient to deter many individuals from evading their tax obligations. In this case, the incidence of tax evasion is amplified over time.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 4 shows the emergence of multiple equilibria in a specific numerical example. Particularly, it plots ( ) 1 B e  against e using 0.3 φ  , 
Capital Accumulation
So far, I have focused on the determinants of tax evasion and its persistence. The overall objective of my analysis is to identify the implications of tax evasion persistence for the 19 Of course, there is a wider range of parameter values that satisfy the conditions of Proposition 3 and are, therefore, associated with multiple steady state equilibria. economy's growth performance. For this reason, it is important to identify the impact of tax evasion on the process of capital accumulation.
Using the production technology in (2), the wage per unit of effective labour in period t is
i.e., profit maximising firms will offer the wage that corresponds to the marginal product of labour. Let t t K k n  denote capital per person and note that the equilibrium in the labour market corresponds to t L n l   . 20 Substituting these in (29) yields
As I indicated earlier, total factor productivity is increasing in the provision of public services and infrastructure -activities that are financed by means of labour income taxation. The aggregate tax revenues in period t comprise the following: Firstly, there is a mass of 1 n  individuals, each of whom pays t φw . Secondly, there is a unit mass of individuals, of whom 1 t e  declare their actual income and each one pays
The remaining mass of t e individuals only declare the income corresponding to one unit of effective labour, thus paying t φw each. Nevertheless, each of them faces a probability of being audited, in which case they will pay the tax on the income they concealed, augmented by the applicable financial penalty. All in all, total tax revenues are given by
Substituting (31) in (3), we can eventually express public spending according to
which can be combined with (29) and t L n l   to rewrite (4) as 20 The supply of labour comprises 1 n  individuals, each of whom supplies one unit of effective labour, and a unit mass of individuals, each of whom supplies 1 l  units of effective labour. Therefore, the aggregate labour supply is ( 1) 1 1 (1 ) n l n l        . For an equilibrium in the labour market, this must be equal to the aggregate demand for effective labour by firms, i.e., t L .
Substituting (33) in (30) , it follows that
Now let us determine the components of aggregate saving in period t . Those individuals with only one unit of effective labour, of whom there are 1 n  , will deposit an amount of (1 ) t φ w  each. From the unit mass of individuals who are endowed with 1 l  units of effective labour, a fraction 1 t e  will deposit (1 ) (1 ) t φ w l   since they are honest in their income declaration. Each of the remaining t e individuals will declare t w in labour income, therefore they will only deposit (1 ) t φ w  to financial intermediaries.
They do so in their attempt to blur the traces of their tax fraud by accessing opportunities that lie outside the domain of the economy's formal financial sector, in order to store their concealed income t w l . Nevertheless, some of them will be audited, in which case they will be forced to pay the evaded taxes, augmented by the financial penalty; any residual income will be deposited to financial intermediaries. In short, aggregate saving in period t is given by
Combining (5) and (35) gives us
in which we can substitute (34) and use
where
The preceding analysis can facilitate us in identifying the impact of t e on the process of capital formation. This is an issue formally analysed through
Thus, we need to establish that
This inequality can be rewritten as
which holds by virtue of (0,1) ξ  and 1 p  , thus completing the proof. □ There are two distinct effects of tax evasion on the processes of investment and capital formation. On the one hand, it reduces the potential amount of funds available for investment, as tax evading individuals avoid depositing their non-declared income to financial intermediaries in order to obscure any trace that could signal their misdemeanour. On the other hand, tax evasion impinges on the provision of productivity-enhancing public infrastructure due to its negative effect on aggregate public revenues. Hence, the incidence of tax evasion has a negative overall effect on the process of capital formation; it is an inhibiting factor to both aggregate private saving/investment and to aggregate productivity.
Tax Evasion and the Path of Economic Development
In this section, I shall combine the results from the different parts of the preceding analysis in order to uncover the implications for the joint evolution of tax evasion and income per capita. With respect to the former, Propositions 2 and 3 revealed outcomes that are rather different in terms of their dynamic implications. In Proposition 2, I identified conditions under which the magnitude of tax evasion converges to a unique, stable long-run equilibrium, irrespective of the pre-existing conditions regarding such illegal practices by tax payers. Under such circumstances, the implications for economic growth and development are straightforward. Specifically, by alluding to Eq. (37), one can determine a unique stable steady state solution for the stock of capital (and income) per person -a steady state whose value will be determined solely by the structural characteristics that affect both tax evasion and the process of investment and capital accumulation. Conditionally on being structurally similar, economies that differ temporarily in terms of the magnitude of tax evasion will see such imbalances waning as they converge to the long-run equilibrium.
However, the focus of the current analysis is on circumstances under which temporary imbalances in the level of tax compliance may persist in the long-run. Given practice so as to deter them from adhering to it. As the incidence of tax evasion declines, the process of capital accumulation is stimulated, hence leading the economy into a path of higher economic development. The future prospects of the economy in which the magnitude of tax evasion is currently high will be quite different though. Given the historically low level of tax compliance across the population, tax evasion is not deemed reprehensible enough to deter successive generations of individuals from attempting to conceal some sources of income. As tax evasion increases, it impedes the process of capital formation, thus preventing the economy from sustaining high levels of economic development.
The dynamics of the economy can be illustrated by means of a phase diagram. Given Naturally, the characteristics that govern the tax evasion-economic growth nexus in my model have significant policy implications, especially on those aspects of policy making that aim at instituting higher tax compliance within the society. Firstly, they point to the importance of these policy targets, not only with respect to temporary benefits in terms of public revenues, but also as a means of improving the overall longterm prospects of the economy. Secondly, the underlying mechanism that generates persistence in tax evasion implies that an effective policy strategy could complement traditional approaches to tax enforcement (e.g., auditing and legal sanctions) with measures that aim at changing the public's consciousness on the widespread repercussions of nefarious practices such as tax fraud, thus changing their overall tax culture. For example, an appropriate policy could entail a long-term plan through which the education system will inculcate in successive generations of people the idea that tax fraud is a reprehensible practice that has major and widespread negative repercussions, both economic and social. Furthermore, the previous policy suggestion can be complemented by efforts to promote the sense of citizenship and community among the population, thus inducing tax compliance and greater social contemptibility in response to the revelation of one's effort to avoid his/her fair share in the contribution of common goods. The importance of such policies becomes even more obvious once we consider the possibility that budgetary or political constraints may impose insurmountable obstacles against a government's efforts to increase the amount of resources devoted to tax enforcement.
Discussion and Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to identify the sources of tax evasion persistence, and examine their implications for economic growth. I have shown that introducing a dynamic externality (in the form of a cultural norm), determining the social contemptibility of tax fraud, may generate multiple, path-dependent equilibria in the dynamics of tax evasion. Given the latter's effect on capital accumulation and growth, I have illustrated that this multiplicity can impinge on the overall economic environment.
Even when the structural characteristics of tax enforcement and capital formation, as well as the current capital stock, are given, the economy's development path will depend crucially on the pre-existing conditions with respect to the magnitude of tax evasion. This is because the cultural norm acts as a propagation mechanism that amplifies current imbalances in the degree of tax compliance, thus embedding them to the characteristics that determine the economy's long-term prospects.
As we have seen, what is crucial when it comes to path-dependent equilibria is not the initial stock of capital, but the initial level of tax compliance. One could argue that introducing an additional component in the determinants of tax auditing -a component that would make the auditing probability increasing in the capital stock -would imply that the initial stock of capital could also play a role in determining the economy's development path. There are two arguments that can address this point. Firstly, even if this is the case, such a framework would not change the main narrative of the existing framework. As long as multiple equilibria exist, there will still be circumstances where, for a given capital stock, the initial magnitude of tax evasion would shape the economy's long-term dynamics. Secondly, there are many authors who claim that the extent to which governments can increase the rate at which they successfully apprehend cases of tax evasion, simply by increasing the resources devoted to tax enforcement, can sometimes be limited. One obvious reason may relate to budgetary constraints, but there are additional arguments as well. According to Selmrod and Yitzhaki (1987) , comparing the increase in resources devoted towards tax enforcement to the increase in expected revenue achieved through this process, does not always indicate a net economic gain. In many circumstances, the alleged tax evaders will try to repudiate the claims against them, thus leading to a protracted (and certainly costly) litigation process. All these are circumstances that question the extent to which the increase of the resources devoted to tax enforcement would always result in an analogous improvement of tax compliance, assuming that such an increase is feasible in the first place -something that is not always the case.
The current framework absconded from some features that pertain to the broad issue of tax fraud, in order to keep the analysis tightly focused on the issue of tax evasion persistence under cultural norms, and its implications for economic dynamics. Certainly, one could envisage various extensions that will enrich the existing results and broaden both their economic and their policy implications. For example, corporate tax evasion (e.g., Chen and Chu 2005) can be an additional element of tax fraud with potentially interesting implications for economic dynamics. The issue of networking and collusion among tax evaders (e.g., Boadway et al. 2002 ) represents yet another social/cultural dimension with significant repercussions for the tax evasion-economic growth nexus.
All these are indubitably important issues, hence representing a fruitful avenue for future research. 
